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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the relationship between the mechanisms of
technology acquisition used by small firms in Chile and the
success of the firms' export activity. A small sample from the
Chilean wood-product industry was taken and direct interviews
were conducted with the founder (or general manager) of each
firm. In addition, a fairly extensive literature review of the
field of technological innovation and business strategy was
conducted.
The experience of the sampled firms in both exporting and
acquiring technology permitted the author to suggest eight
patterns of technology incorporation. These patterns have
implications for the firm's competitive strategy, for most of
them portray "conditions for success" in exporting and
incorporating technology. They also indicate the direct
relationship that exists between importing technology (basically
process technology) and exporting the firm's product. The data
shows that small-firm exporting activity is a technology-driven
phenomenon.
The reduced size of the sample implies that the thesis' findings
ought to be considered with caution. However, some interesting
recommendations for technology policy making at the national
level can be drawn from the study. These recommendations,
together with a list of questions left unanswered, are outlined
in the last part of this thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
This short master's thesis is aimed to shed light on the
awareness and use of technology as a strategic variable of
competition by small firms in Chile. In particular, I want to
explore the mechanisms of technology acquisition used by these
firms and the purpose of each innovation, as well as the
relationship between them and the firm's export business. The
purpose behind each innovation indicates the firms' technology
strategy. My original hypothesis was that for small firms,
technology was an export-driven phenomenon, that is, the need for
technology only emerged in firms as a consequence of their export
activity and the new standards that this activity implies, and
not as part of a defined strategy to gain access to new foreign
markets or to achieve cost-competitiveness. To my surprise, I
realized that my original hypothesis was basically wrong. Most
of the firms in the sample appeared to be much more aware of the
importance of technology as a competitive variable than I
thought.
The mechanisms of technology acquisition used by the firms,
as I will show later, might suggest ways of improving the making
of technological policies at the national level. I decided to
I The export activity of small firms in Chile is a recent
phenomenon induced by a shift of the economy in the middle
seventies toward a free-market, export oriented economy.
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research small firms in Chile given my background and previous
work experience. For three years, I worked for the Chilean
Institute for Export Promotion (PROCHILE), helping small-and
medium-sized firms to export. While working at this job, I
realized that even though small firms have shown a dynamic export
behavior in the last decade, they have been, to a large extent,
out of reach of government technology policies. The self-
financing goal demanded of governmental institutes of technology
and universities during this period meant that they had to orient
their support toward big and established firms-- those with
greater payment capabilities.2 I believe this thesis will serve
as a guide for further research that can improve government
policies to foster small firms' innovation, and hence their
development and exporting activity. All too often it is
forgotten that a deep understanding of the firm's behavior is a
pre-requisite for a proper policy design.
The data for this thesis comes from two sources. The first
one, and the most important, is direct interviews with Chilean
firms held in January 1988. A small sample (4 firms) was taken,
with no other ambition than to raise questions for further
research and suggest possible patterns of small firms' attitude
2 See Corporacion de Promocion Universitaria (1987), op.
cit. pags. 52 and 167. It should be said, however, that a
positive effect of the self-financing policy was that it
encouraged universities and research institutes to strengthen
their ties with the industrial sector.
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toward technology. The second source of data is a fairly
extensive literature review. As I will show later, many of the
patterns that I observed in the firms in the sample are
consistent with different concepts developed in the field of
technological innovation and strategy.
The sampled firms compete in the wood-product industry.
Although a four-firm sample may appear too small for such a
multi-supplier, multi-consumer industry, this is not the case
when we consider the sub-segment of firms that have export
businesses. The focus of this thesis is on export oriented
firms. Indeed, the four sampled firms belong to ASIMAD , the
most important Chilean association of wood-product industry
manufacturers. Out of the approx. 30 members of ASIMAD, only 12
have export businesses of some significance. Three out of the
four firms in the sample come from this last group of 12 firms.
In addition, ASIMAD members' exports in 1987 represented 63 per
cent of the total wood-product industry exports from Chile. Part
III will give more information about the wood-product industry.
In spite of what I just said in the previous paragraph, the
reduced size of the sample necessarily means that the patterns
and questions arising from the present thesis ought to be
considered with caution, for they are exploratory findings. It
I Asociacion Gremial de Industriales de la Madera (Wood-
Product Industry Association).
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was not within the reach of this thesis to come up with
elaborate, final conclusions. Rather, the aim was to prepare the
ground for a bigger research effort.
The selection of the Chilean wood-product industry as the
sample industry (e.g., as the universe where the sample was taken
from) might be questioned. This industry has been traditionally
domestic-market oriented. Yet this thesis is focused on export-
oriented firms' behavior. Moreover, the current share of the
industry's exports in the total exports of Chile is very small,
less than one per cent. Where is the rationale, then, behind my
selection? First, small firms in general have not had an
important participation in Chilean exports throughout its
history, so it is difficult in any case to find a small-firm-
dominated industry with an export tradition. Chilean exports
have been historically carried out by large (frequently foreign)
firms, mainly associated with mining or other natural-resource-
based industries. Second, and related to this, I believe the
wood-product industry presents an interesting example that we
will see more often in the future of an industry composed of many
small firms, traditionally domestic-market oriented, that is
"awakening" to export activity.
In terms of methodology, I already said that direct
interviews are the main source of information for the thesis. It
was clear to me that in order to address the issues that
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interested me (e.g. to explore the mechanisms and purpose of
technology acquisition by small firms), a direct contact with the
firms had to be established. The only way to get accurate
information about the set of processes taking place within a firm
when faced with technology choices, was to get it from the
architect of those processes, the protagonist of the story.
Because the firms in the sample were small and simple in terms of
organizational structure, the firm's founder (who was also the
general manager) was interviewed. In two of the cases, the
interviewee had an engineering background. In all of the cases,
no mater what his background was, the founder or manager was
deeply involved with manufacturing issues (as well as with
managerial ones).
Interviewees were asked to respond to a survey which covered
general information about the firm and specific questions about
the export business and technology acquisitions of their firms.
In particular, they were asked to list what they considered to be
the major technologies incorporated by their firm during the last
decade. Even further, they were asked to "tell the story" of
each major incorporation of technology, e.g. where did the idea
come from, what was the mode of incorporation, its purpose, etc.
Finally, an open-ended discussion about their experiences in
exporting and incorporating technology would close the interview.
Each interview was typically one or two hours long.
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This thesis is divided in four parts plus this introduction.
The following part, or part II, will describe briefly the
analytical concepts and tools from the literature review that are
most relevant to the thesis' findings. Part III will present
some information about the firms in the sample and will describe
the "story" of each of the major technologies incorporated by the
firms, as mentioned by the interviewees. Part IV will describe
the patterns of technology incorporation and export strategy
suggested by the analysis of the interviews. Lastly, part V will
draw the main exploratory conclusions of the thesis and will
raise some questions for further research.
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I I ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKS
As with most disciplines, the literature in the field of
technology and strategy is represented by an extensive set of
frameworks and concepts that help explain the firms' strategic
technological behavior and the influence of external factors. Of
course, a detailed description of each contribution in the field
goes far beyond the scope of this thesis. My focus here is much
narrower than that of the general literature on technology and
strategy, for I am only concerned with the interplay between
technology strategy and export behavior at the small firms'
level. Therefore, I shall limit myself to presenting briefly
those concepts or frameworks that, I believe, are more relevant
to my findings. A concept or framework will be relevant to the
thesis if it supports, opposes or provides a context for
understanding the patterns suggested from the interviews'
analysis.
2.1 Innovation and the Strategy of the Firm.
An important framework of analysis results from looking at
the various strategies open to a firm when confronted with
technical change. These strategies reflect the attitude and
commitment of the firm toward technology. The simplest way to
represent firm's technology strategy is by defining two basic
positions, technological leadership and technological
followership. However, this simple classification does not seem
7
to capture all the relevant strategic positions open to a firm,
especially when considering firms in developing countries. In
the development that follows, I will adhere to a taxonomy for
technological strategy proposed by Freeman, 1982.*
a) Offensive Strategy. In an offensive innovation strategy, the
firm attempts to achieve technical and market leadership by being
ahead of competitors in the introduction of new products or
processes. Almost by definition, this strategy must be based on
a close connection with the world science-technology system and
strong internal R&D capabilities. The firm has either to
generate the relevant new knowledge or to have easy and opportune
access to it if it is generated elsewhere.5 For the particular
case of product innovation, which has been the primary focus of
the literature dealing with offensive strategy, a close relation
with the user or customer becomes crucial. In fact, many of the
firms pursuing an offensive technological strategy develop
training and assistance programs for their customers, in order to
get valuable feedback from them for the product design phase.
b) Defensive Strategy. A defensive innovator, as well as an
offensive one, will be deeply concerned with long-range planning.
However, the defensive innovator may not want to incur the heavy
* C. Freeman, 1982, op.cit. pag. 169.
5 Even this later option implies solid technological
capabilities within the firm.
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risks of being the first to move into the new technology. A firm
pursuing this strategy will attempt to profit from the experience
and mistakes of the first mover. Its strategy will be to react
quickly to the new technology and try to leapfrog the original
offensive innovator, by improving on his idea or by being more
cost-effective.
Therefore, a defensive firm is also knowledge-intensive.
Its technical staff must be highly qualified and familiar with
the state-of-the-art technology, for the experimental development
and design of new products and processes is a decisive capability
for defensive firms (as well as for offensive ones).
c) Imitative Strategy. An imitative firm does not aspire to
leapfrog the original innovators. It does not even attempt to
keep pace with the technological advances being introduced by
them. It is content to lag behind the offensive and defensive
firms, buying know-how (or licensing, if the lag is not too long)
from them. In order to compete, the imitative firm will rely on
either "captive" markets or cost advantages with respect to its
technologically more advanced competitors. Especially in young
industries (where product innovation is abundant), imitative
firms will tend to be thrown off by the introduction of new
generations of equipment by their offensive and defensive
counterparts.
As cost advantages become crucial in order to compete,
production engineering and design are functions in which the firm
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following an imitative strategy must be strong. The procurement
of information about possible new products to imitate, etc., is
also a critical factor for the success of an imitative strategy;
it is a factor that can be strongly influenced by local
circumstances and national policies, especially in developing
countries.
d) Dependent Strategy. A dependent firm has accepted its
subordination to a stronger firm, usually a foreign one if the
dependent firm is in a developing country. A firm like this does
not perform any R&D and has lost its product design abilities.
It only incorporates technical improvements at specific requests
from its customer or parent. A purely dependent firm does not
behave differently from a department or workshop of a larger
firm.
e) Traditional Strategy. A firm pursuing a "traditional"
strategy shares many characteristics with a dependent firm,
although it is not a satellite of a larger firm. The main
difference between these two types of firms lies in their product
variation. A dependent firm's product changes frequently at the
customer's request. A traditional firm has no incentive to
change the product: the market does not demand change and the
firm itself does not have the technological commitment to
generate change. Traditional firms usually operate in mature
industries with severe competitive conditions.
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f) Opportunistic Strategy. Firms following this strategy are
niche-searchers. As Freeman describes this strategy,
"entrepreneurs will identify some new opportunity in the rapidly
changing market, which may not require any in-house R&D, or
complex design, but will enable them to prosper by finding an
important "niche," and providing a product or service which
consumers need, but nobody else has thought to provide."
2.2 Product v/s Process Development and the Industry Life Cycle.
Another significant contribution in the literature of
technological innovation has been the idea that the nature and
importance of both product and process innovation change over
time. W. Abernathy and J. Utterback are well known for their
development of this concept. They have proposed that, as
industry matures over time, two interrelated technological
phenomena takes place. First, the production process develops
toward levels of improved output productivity achieved through
greater capital intensity, scale and standardization. Second,
and similarly, product development also follows a predictable
pattern as industry matures. The initial emphasis is on product
performance, which then shifts toward product variety. A final
stage is achieved where the emphasis is on product
standardization and cost reduction.
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When product and process evolution over time are put
together, an integrative pattern like the one in figure 1
results. Product innovation is relatively more important than
process innovation in the early stage of the industry. In the
early stage, many new products are introduced with a high degree
of uncertainty about their market potential. To respond to these
demands, the production process is flexible, with vague
relationships between process elements. As industry matures to a
second stage, product market uncertainty is reduced and price
competition becomes important. In order to achieve greater
efficiency, the process becomes tightly integrated through
automation and control. Finally, in a third stage, the product
becomes standardized; competition centers almost entirely on
price and the industry often becomes an oligopoly. Consequently,
efficiency and economies of scale are emphasized in production.
Technological change is incremental in nature and often involves
modifications in both product and process at the same time.
High
Product innovation
Process innovation
0 Need
> stimulated0C region
.C Technology
stimulated
0 Output rate Cost
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stimulate
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2.3 Corporate Roles for Technological Innovation.
Since Donald Schon wrote an influential article in 1963,
proposing the importance of "Champions for Radical New
Inventions,"' much has been written about the different roles (or
functions) needed within the firm for a successful technological
innovation. Indeeo, Schon refines his concept of "product
champion" in his 1966 book Technology and Change. Later
developments (Roberts & Fusfeld, Maidique) have expanded the
original concept of the product champion. They have proposed a
complementary higher-level championing function. This
championing function would be a high-level executive that
protects and supports the usually lower-level product champion
that is carrying out the new idea within the firm.
Other roles for successful technological innovation have
been identified, such as the "gatekeeper" (Allen, 1977). All
these roles came into being in the literature through the direct
study of many innovation attempts by firms, often very detailed
studies focused only on one particular case. For the purpose of
this presentation, I will distinguish five corporate roles
(functions) critical for an innovation's success. I will be
following closely the development of Roberts & Fusfeld, 1981.
The reader should keep in mind that each of these functions can
* Donald A. Schon (1963) "Champions for Radical New
Inventions," in Harvard Business Review, March-April 1963.
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be carried out by one or more individuals within the firm. The
corporate roles are:
a) Idea Generating. A person (or group of persons) is able to
collect and synthesize diverse information about technologies and
markets, so that a new idea (usually for an new or improved
product, service or process) is generated.
b) Championing or Entrepreneuring. An individual recognizes the
value of the new idea and emerges as its champion: proposing,
pushing and demonstrating for management approval.
c) Project Leading. Once the idea is demonstrated, it has to be
put into practice. This movement demands a set of activities and
people that have to be coordinated.
d) Gatekeeping. During the development of an idea within the
firm, the information gatekeeper provides~ crucial inputs to the
process. This individual collects and channels internal and
external information about changes in the environment that could
influence the idea being developed. Although the original
gatekeeper concept deals primarily with technical information,
later contributions have expanded the concept's scope toward
market information as well.
e) Sponsoring or Coaching. This role is what I mentioned before
as the "executive champion," e.g. the higher-level person within
the firm that provides support and protection for the new idea.
This role becomes crucial when the time comes to ask and push for
funds to continue the innovation project.
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2.4 The Sources of Innovation.
To some extent, the concept of the sources of innovation is
a sort of extension of the "idea generating" role just described
in the above section. The basic notion behind this contribution
is that the product manufacturer is not always the source of the
innovation, e.g. the place where the idea for a new product is
developed. The most well known scholar advocating this position
is E. von Hippel, who has used numerous case studies to question
the implicit assumption that manufacturers typically develop
their own innovations.
The author has proposed a classification of firms and
individuals "in terms of the functional relationship through
which they derive benefit from a given product, process or
service innovation." 7 That is, users are those who benefit
from using the product (or process, or service). Manufacturers
are those who benefit from manufacturing it. Suppliers are those
who benefit from providing the component or materials necessary
to build (or use) the innovation. It is proposed that the source
of innovation can be predicted by estimating the expected
benefits of the innovation itself, e.g. the temporary profits or
"economic rents" by potential innovators (manufacturers, users or
suppliers). The ability of potential innovators to seize the
benefits of an innovation will depend, of course, on many factors
both internal and external to the innovator.
7 E. von Hippel, 1988, Part 1, Overview.
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Von Hippel has stressed the importance of users in developing
new product ideas. His more recent work has emphasized inter-
industry differences in terms of who is the source of innovation.
Innovation in the scientific instruments industry, for instance,
appears to be user-dominated. New ideas in the plastic additives
industry seem to come basically from the manufacturer. The
supplier appears as the main source of innovation in the wire
termination equipment industry."
The importance of users in developing new ideas for
innovation tends to confirm early findings such as the ones of
project SAPPHO,' where "closeness to consumers" was identified as
one of the most significant variables contributing to
innovation's success. The importance of "closeness to users" is
even greater when referring to new products. The back and forth
communication flow between user and manufacturer has proved
crucial to the successful design and later market acceptance of
new products.
* Ibid.
* Project SAPPHO was carried out at the Science Policy
Research Unit during the 1970's, under the direction of R.
Rothwell. Its main goal was to test several generalizations
about technical innovation by comparing pairs of successful and
unsuccessful attempts to innovate.
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III THE FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE AND THE MAJOR TECHNOLOGIES
INCORPORATED DURING THE LAST DECADE.
3.1 An Overview of the Wood-Product Industry.
To a large extent, exporting is a novel phenomenon for the
Chilean wood-product industry. For most industry products,
export activity began only in the early eighties. Table 1
shows the rapid increase in total industry exports from 1982 to
1987. During that period the total figure more than tripled. As
the table shows, the industry can be divided into three
categories: furniture, construction items, and "other products."
Furniture products range from simple shelves to fancier beds
or dining sets. Construction items include doors and windows,
construction panels, wooded roof-tiles, and molds. The category
"other products" groups many different products, such as ice-
cream sticks, match sticks, broomsticks, picture frames, and
wooden toys. It is interesting to note that the only
"traditional" export product (i.e. the one with significant
exports before 1982) of the Chilean wood-product industry is ice-
cream sticks. Indeed, the export behavior of this only product
(which has been decreasing in both absolute and relative
importance since 1982) explains the rather low growth of "other
products" exports during the period considered in Table 1.
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TABLE 1:CRILEAN WOOD-BASED INDUSTRY EXPORTS
(U.S.S x 1000)
% increase
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1982-1987
Furniture 175 310 148 452 1,928 3,101 1,672%
Construction Items 90 128 251 224 733 753 736%
Other wood-based
products 1,183 1,042 1,369 1,829 1,577 1.254 6%
Total Exports 1,449 1,481 1,620 2,506 4,239 5,008 245%
In spite of the rapid increase in wood-based industry
exports during the eighties, they constitute only a marginal
share of Chile's total manufacturing exports. Currently, this
participation is in the neighborhood of one per cent. In turn,
the participation of manufacturing exports in the total export
figure of the country has been in the neighborhood of 30 per cent
during the last years.
3.2 The firms in the sample.
For the sake of confidentiality, artificial names have been
given to the firms in the sample. Of the four firms, only one is
an old industry participant, established in 1935. A second firm
was founded in 1960, and the remaining two were created only in
18
the eighties.
Firms in the wood-product industry have been traditionally
domestic-market oriented. With the sole exception of RAULI INC.,
the firms in the sample follow this tendency even today. RAULI
INC., the youngest firm in the sample, is a true export firm,
selling 100 per cent of its production in foreign markets. For
the remaining three firms, the participation of exports in the
firm's total sales does not go beyond 15 per cent. However, as I
indicated before, the industry is increasingly turning its eyes
to exports: one may expect a greater export participation in the
years to come.
Despite this trend, the amount exported by each firm is
still scanty. In 1987, only ROBLE INC. approached half a million
dollars in exports. Two other firms, ALERCE INC. and RAULI INC.,
had significant although lower export figures in 1987. Only one,
ULMO INC., did not export during this year. In analyzing the
export figures and their evolution, it is necessary to keep in
mind that the Chilean exchange rate (with respect to the dollar)
was frozen from 1979 to 1982. This period is considered by the
interviewees as a black period for export activity. Some firms
that were already exporting before that period, such as ALERCE,
had to quit exporting when the official Chilean currency became
too overvalued. Therefore, the period 1982-1987 should be seen
as one of re-building foreign contacts and export skills.
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For the purposes of this thesis, all the firms in the sample
are "small firms," even though some of them might be classified
as low-end medium-sized firms by Chilean standards. In terms of
the number of staff, the two biggest firms (ROBLE and ULMO) have
a total of 180 people (table 2). The smallest one, RAULI, has
only 40. The three firms with more than 140 employees are
similar in terms of the training or "quality" of the human
resources, and in particular of the technical personnel. The
three of them have a technical staff of 13 to 15 people.
However, it is interesting to note that ALERCE has the greatest
proportion of engineers, with respect to lower-level technicians.
The United States is the chief destination for exports of
the sample firms. Only one firm, ALERCE, makes foreign sales to
another country than the United States (United Kingdom). The
four firms export seven different products, as shown in Table 2.
The table also displays a list of what the interviewees
considered to be the major technologies incorporated by their
firms, which will be analyzed in some detail below.
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TABLE 2. THE FIRMS: SUMMARY TABLE
Z ERT
SALES
EIW TRACK
FIRM (USS)
MAIN
EIW EPDUTS
MAIN
INTERNTIONAL
MARKETS
HUMAN RES0RCE
Managers E- Engineers
Technicians L- Total
MAJOR IENPCATIMS
OTFE'KNWGY
ALERCE INC. 200,000 (1987) 10% Doors (flash door U.S.A. M= 3 Wood Kiln
solid core) United Kindom E= 5 Finger-Joint
Founded 1935 Has exported in Wood Parts T- 8 High-temperature wood kiln
different periods Molding L= 140 Honeycomb
through its history. Plant mechanization
(USS 8 millions to Wood-carving and finishing line
Venezuela during Print-design line
1975-1977).
ROBLE INC. 450,000 (1987) 15% Futon Beds U.S.A. M= 3 Design and construction
Wood shelves E- 2 of a new, semi-automated
Founded 1960 Started exporting K.D. T- 12 plant.
in 1986. L- 180
RAULI INC. 360,000 (1987) 100% Wood shelves U.S.A. M= 1 Design and constuction of
Wood trays E= 1 a mass-production plant
Founded 1985 Started exporting Wood boxes T= 1 (plant "as a system")
in 1986. L- 40 Product Design (wood tray)
ULMO INC. 20,000 (1986) 2% Furniture U.S.A. M= 4 Polyurethane-finished surface
(beds) E+T= 15 Wood-bending.
Founded 1980 Exported only once. L- 180
3.3 The Incorporation of Technology by the Firms.
The purpose of this section is to tell the "story" behind
each of the major technologies listed in table 2. Each
interviewee was asked to explain how his firm got the idea of
incorporating each technology listed, and how and why they
eventually incorporated it. These technology tales will pave the
way for understanding the general patterns that will be discussed
in Part IV. The description of each incorporation of technology
does not pretend to be complete or accurate to the finest detail.
Rather, it presents the necessary background for each individual
case that will allow the detection of possible general patterns.
The technologies have been listed under the firm that
incorporated them. Table 3 below gives a brief account of the
technologies considered as major innovations by the sample
entrepreneurs.
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THE FIRMS' INCORPORATION OF TECHNOLOGY
IECPmATED
TECINOI1O IN YEAR BY FIRM
NODE OF
ACQUISITION
A~JISITIOR ORIGIN OF TIlE IDEA
Wood kiln
Finger-Joint
High-temperature
wood kilns
Honeycomb
Plant mechanization
(marginal improvements)
Wood- carving and
finishing line
Print-design line
Desing and construction
of a semi-automated plant
Desing and construction
of a mass-production plant
New wood tray design
Polyurethane-finished
surface
Wood bending
1974
1978 & 1981
1979
1975
continuous
1981 & 1985
1981
1982
1985
1986
1986
1987
ALERCE Inc.
ALERCE Inc.
ALERCE Inc.
ALERCE Inc.
ALERCE Inc.
ALERCE Inc.
ALERCE Inc.
ROBLE Inc.
RAULI Inc.
RAULI Inc.
ULMO Inc.
ULMO Inc.
Purchase
Purchase
Internal Development
License
Internal Development
Purchase ('81)
Internal Develp ('85)
Imitation (developed
from competitor's)
Hired international
consulting firm
Internal Development
Chilean Consultants
Internal Development
Internal Development
Imitation (developed
from competitor's)
Australia
Germany ('78)
Brazil ('81)
U.S.A.
Sweeden (applicat)
Italy
U.S.A.(competitor)
France (parts)
Germany (parts)
Germany
Chile (competitor)
American Buyer - Firm entrepreneur
American Buyer - Firm entrepreneur
Firm entrepreneur
Internat. fair - Firm entrepreneur
Technical staff, firm entrepreneur
Firm entrepreneur
Competitor - Firm entrepreneur
Firm entrepreneurs
Firm entrepreneurs
Buyer - Firm entrepreneur
Supplier's suggestion
Competitor - Firm entrepreneur
TA B LE 3.
ORIGIN OF TEK IDEA
ALERCE INC.
a) Wood Kiln (1974). By the early seventies, the firm began to
realize that domestic supply of dried wood was not reliable.
Delivery dates were frequently disregarded, and the quality of
the delivered product was not uniform. The firm saw this
procurement problem as an important constraint in boosting its
export business. At that time they were exporting to the United
States and working on the possibility of exporting to a Latin
American country.
The American buyer for ALERCE's products suggested that
ALERCE should get their own capacity for wood-drying. In Chile,
the firm got the references of an Australian kiln manufacturer
that had installed similar equipment in the country (to one of
the industry's dried-wood suppliers). ALERCE contacted the
Australian manufacturer and bought from them the equipment plus
installation assistance. Australian specialists helped the firm
to install the kiln and transferred the new skills and know-how
to the firm's technical personnel. Since then, ALERCE dries its
own wood.
b) Finger Joint (1978, 1981). As in the case of the wood kilns,
the firm's American buyer suggested that they should get the
finger-joint technology. Most products being imported by the
United States incorporated it. The American buyer introduced
ALERCE to two American technicians, highly experienced in the
wood-product industry. These were brought by the firm to Chile
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in 1977 for a period of six months, with the purpose of
evaluating the specific characteristics of the equipment that
ALERCE needed. They also evaluated the use and efficiency of the
wood kilns, the current lay-out of the plant, and suggested
several improvements throughout the production process so that it
would meet American standards for imported products. The
technicians belonged to a Californian plant, so that an agreement
between the Chilean and the American firms had to be worked out.
ALERCE realized that the finger-joint technology represented
a big domestic competitive advantage (nobody else had it in
Chile), whilst at the same time it would facilitate exports. The
first equipment was bought in Germany in 1978. In 1981, another
piece of equipment was bought from Germany. Finally, a special
machine for structural parts was designed and built in Brazil,
tailored to the firm's needs. Today, finger-joint technology is
mainly used by the firm in door frames, for both export and
domestic markets.
c) Print-Design Line (1981). This technology was developed
internally by the firm's technical staff based on a model seen at
a competitor's plant in California, U.S.A. Some Chilean
engineering consulting was required during the design development
phase. The many parts of the line were brought from different
countries, especially from France, Germany, and the United
States. Some of them were obtained domestically. The chemical
components of the line, for instance, were formulated in Chile.
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Foreign chemicals were too expensive and sophisticated to be used
by the firm. The print-design line is basically used in door
production, both for the export and domestic markets.
d) Wood-Carving and Finishing Line (1981, 1985). The function of
this line is to carve different shapes on wooden surfaces, and
then to sand and varnish the wood panel. It is basically used on
door surfaces. The line was bought in 1981 from an Italian
manufacturer. In 1985, the line was improved through internal
development: the capacity was expanded and some sub-processes
were speeded-up.
e) Honeycomb (1975). The firm's executives saw honeycomb for the
first time during an international fair. They realized honeycomb
was a simpler and cheaper way to handle door filling than current
techniques. Cost reduction (stemming from lower cost of honeycomb
and time savings in the process) would represent an important
competitive advantage in the domestic market and would facilitate
exports. ALERCE got the license to produce honeycomb in Chile
from an American company. For some specialized applications of
honeycomb, the Chilean firm procured the help of a Swedish
consultant firm. ALERCE also benefited from patent protection in
Chile for a considerable period of time before new competitors
entered the domestic market.
The benefit of using honeycomb can be understood by
considering that the productivity (output/labor ratio) of
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ALERCE's door production line increased by 30% after the
introduction of honeycomb. The percentage of defective output
also dropped substantially. The main use of honeycomb is in
"flash doors," in contrast to "solid core" doors which use
particle board as filling material. In addition, honeycomb is
sold to other door manufacturers in Chile although this sale has
declined rapidly after the patent protection expired allowing new
competitors to enter the market.
f) High-Temperature Kilns. The firm designed and built these
high-temperature kilns internally. The experience gained during
the installation and later use of the Australian kilns was
crucial. The incorporation of this technology was mainly carried
out by ALERCE's technical personnel. Some domestic engineering
consulting was needed for the design phase. The main reason to
invest in this technology was a concern for cost-reduction.
High-temperature wood dryers, relative to the Australian dryers
bought in 1974, would allow a larger heated surface at higher
temperatures (over 100 degrees). This, in turn, would reduce
drying time and increase productivity and, hence, reduce drying
cost.
ROBLE INC.
a) Whole Design of a New Plant (1981-1982). As for almost all
industries in Chile, the period 1977 to 1980 was a period of
rapid growth, for the domestic economy was becoming strong
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rapidly. Consequently, the wood-product industry, and in
particular the firm ROBLE, experienced rapid development until
1980. However, motivated by its steep sales increase, in 1981
ROBLE came to the conclusion that its plant was obsolete. The
activity level of the years to come could not be confronted with
the current condition of the plant. Furthermore, the firm's
management decided it was not worthwhile to spend money trying to
improve the existing plant. A whole new plant was needed.
The firm realized that if new technology was introduced
to the plant, it would be possible not only to obtain domestic
competitive advantage, but also a world-class production process.
Because one of the founders is of German descent (with active
contacts in Germany), they got in touch with, and then hired, a
consulting firm in Germany to design a new, semi-automated plant.
This allowed the firm to start operating in 1982 with a plant
that had a technical level comparable to that of a good firm in a
developed country.
Nevertheless, recessive conditions in 1982-1983
meant sub-utilization of the new plant. The domestic market was
stagnant and ROBLE explored international markets without
success. Only at the end of 1983 did the economic picture start
to improve. The firm decided to invest time and money in export-
oriented activities. They planned to participate in
international fairs as a regular activity. Since then, ROBLE has
participated at least three times a year in industry-specific
events throughout the world. The firm uses its participation in
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international events as a way to establish contacts with
potential buyers, as well as to gain exposure to new technologies
that could be brought back to Chile.
ROBLE started exporting in 1986. In that first year,
exports totaled US$ 60,000 and represented 5% of the firm's total
sales. One year after, in 1987, ROBLE's exports totaled US$
450,000, representing 15% of the sales of that year. For 1988,
a higher figure, both in absolute and relative terms, is
expected.
RAULI INC.
a) Wood Trays to the United States. This firm is the only one in
the sample founded uniquely as an export firm. In 1985, the same
year the firm was founded, its managers travelled to the U.S.
with the aim of identifying possible products that they could
make and export. They also wanted to contact potential buyers.
It is interesting to note that the firm's executives used, more
than any other interviewee, the international network of the
Chilean Institute for Export Promotion in order to get access to
firms and events in the United States. RAULI contacted a
supermarket chain. The supermarket purchasing manager wanted to
have alternative suppliers for a wood tray that they were
currently importing from an Asian country. They gave RAULI
executives samples and specifications of the tray and asked the
Chilean entrepreneurs if they could produce one container (to
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begin with) at a given price per tray.
Once back in Chile, RAULI realized they could produce the
tray but there was not enough profit margin at the price set by
the supermarket. The firm was aware that the low-cost tray was
very sensitive to transportation cost. They realized that the
current dimensions of the tray meant a significant loss of
container space, which in turn meant a higher transportation
cost. They engaged in redesigning the tray in order to maximize
the use of container space and, at the same time, to minimize the
aesthetic changes. The new tray could not look too different
from the one the buyer wanted.
After several designs and prototypes, they came
out with a similar product (slightly smaller) that would fully
use the container space. Both the shape of the tray and its
packaging were somewhat altered to achieve this goal. With
samples of the new tray in their suitcases, the entrepreneurs
flew back to the United States and were able to convince the
supermarket to buy their product. Today, trays are exported on
a continuous basis.
b) High-Volume Plant (plant as a system). From the beginning,
when they were planning to create the firm and discussing its
future strategy, RAULI's executives realized that the export
market for most wood-based products was highly price-sensitive.
They recognized the implications of this in manufacturing:
production "in batches" (the method most Chilean wood-based firms
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and workshops still use), did not permit cost competitiveness.
Consequently, they took special care in to design the plant as an
"export system." This translated into a semi-continuous process
that allows high-volume output and hence low cost. The plant
design also included on-site container filling to speed-up the
whole process.
ULMO INC.
a) Polyurethane-Finished Surface. A Chilean supplier of the
wood, wood-product and chemical industries suggested this
technology to ULMO. To this extent, one could say that the firm
is "not responsible" for this attempt to innovate. Indeed, the
supplier's suggestion is considered by ULMO as "accidental" in
the sense that it does not respond to an active effort of the
firm to get ideas from the outside.
ULMO thought that the suggested technology could represent
an important competitive advantage, especially for the domestic
market, because only one Chilean competitor had mastered it. The
firm, encouraged by the supplier's promised assistance, tried to
develop the polyurethane-finished surface technology through its
own technical staff and resources. As they did not have enough
information about the technology, they followed a painful "trial
and error" path. The supplier, who was supposed to know the
process (they supply the only Chilean firm that has this
technology), showed himself to be unable to solve the specific
technical problems that ULMO encountered during the development
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phase. Because of the many technical problems, originally-
estimated deadlines started to lag behind, costs started to
climb and the development was eventually abandoned.
b) Bending-Wood Technology. ULMO wanted to improve its product
line in order to compete in a more sophisticated segment of the
domestic market where a modern bending-wood technology was
necessary. In this case, the idea of getting the bending-wood
technology was conceived by the top managers, as a result of
their decision to enter the new market segment. A secondary
motivation for acquiring the technology was the hope of gaining
access to export markets.
The firm got the technology by analyzing the equipment of a
domestic competitor's plant. The firm would not say which
competitor and how they managed to gain access to the basic
technology. Relying on its own staff, ULMO developed the
technology at its plant, using a method similar to that used to
develop the polyurethane-finished surface technology just
described. Although this time they were relatively more
successful, they have not yet obtained the expected results.
There is still a higher-than expected down time in the process
and a high defective-output rate. For this reason, the firm's
top manager classified the development of bending-wood technology
only as a partial success and ULMO has been unable to use this
technology as a leverage for its desired export business.
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PART IV EXPORTS AND THE PATTERNS OF TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATION.
On the basis of the analysis of the innovations listed by
the firms in the sample (which were detailed in the preceding
part of this thesis), I will present here what I think are the
main patterns of technology incorporation and their
interrelationship with the firms' export businesses. As I said
in the introduction of this thesis, the suggested patterns should
be interpreted with caution, for the sample size does not permit
ultimate generalizations. However, the suggested patterns are to
a large extent consistent with some concepts and frameworks
developed in the field-- some of them presented in Part II. The
patterns pose interesting questions for further research which I
will outline in the next part of the thesis.
Here is the list and brief description of the patterns:
4.1 Network Sleuthing. The surveyed firms identified access to
strategic technological information as the key factor in
improving their ability to innovate. This strategic
technological information is costly to obtain, for it was
perceived as being produced outside Chile, in leading countries
(especially in the United States). Therefore, building and
maintaining an "international network of information exchange"
was seen as the most efficient way to obtain technological
information.
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Entrepreneurs of successful firms become actual "network
sleuths." These network sleuths spend considerable time and
money participating in industry-related events throughout the
world, even though they sometimes get no immediate benefits from
them. International fairs were perceived as the most important
kind of events. Through these events, the network sleuths
establish contacts with potential suppliers of know-how (as well
as with potential buyers of their products).
Observed modes of know-how acquisition range from contacting
international consultants to gaining access to a competitor plant
in a developed country. More frequently, however, the network
sleuth will see a demonstration of new equipment in an
international fair and will get in touch with the equipment
manufacturer, from whom the Chilean firm will buy the equipment
(together with some initial technical assistance) later.
ALERCE's management provides a good example of network sleuthing,
probably the best among the firms in the sample. It is
surprising to see the many countries from which its incorporation
of technology springs (see table 3).
It is not difficult to realize that the network sleuth
performs several of the roles for successful innovation that I
mentioned in part II, during the literature review. He is often
the idea generator, for he brings in new technologies that his
firm was not aware of before. This is the case of ALERCE's
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honeycomb, for instance.1 He is always an information
gatekeeper, for he gathers internal and external information
(both technology and market information) that contributes to
shaping his firm's technology incorporation. Finally, given that
he is usually the general manager or a top executive, he acts as
a sponsor or "executive champion" for the ideas he brings in.
4.2 Importing process technology - exporting the product.
The analysis of the different technologies incorporated by
the firms in the sample indicates a clear correlation between
importing process technology and exporting the product. In
almost all the cases, the export business was made possible (one
could say it required) by a process innovation. In some cases
the process technology brought to the firm was very specific to
the product whose exports it helped, as was the case with
ALERCE's honeycomb and door's exports. In other cases, the
process technology was broad enough to affect the fate of many
export products. The extreme case of this latter point is the
design and construction of a new plant, as done by ROBLE and
RAULI.
This tight interrelationship between importing process
10 However, sometimes the idea for an innovation is
generated within the Chilean firm. In these cases, the network
sleuth's role is limited to looking for the most convenient way
to bring the technology to the firm, when this cannot be produced
internally.
35
technology and exporting the product is what invalidates my
former hypothesis that technology was an export-driven phenomenon
for small firms in Chile. The rationale behind my initial
hypothesis was that the new commercial opportunities created by a
new, export-oriented economic policy would induce firms (even
small firms) to export. As newly exporting firms tried to expand
their foreign businesses toward new products, they would have to
meet new and more sophisticated specific.ations and product
standards. In order to meet these new standards, the firms would
be pushed to incorporate modern technology; i.e. exporting would
be the driver of technology incorporation. But the fact was that
in most of the cases, the technologies were incorporated by firms
before they began to export, i.e. in order to facilitate their
export businesses. A "technology strategy" (or at least the main
guidelines for such a strategy) was definitely behind the
innovations.
In terms of Freeman's classification of technological
strategy, the firms in the sample would lie close to the
"imitative strategy." They do not aspire to keep pace or
leapfrog the technology of their developed-country competitors.
New technology helps the firms to compete by cutting down
production costs or enabling them to meet foreign product
standards. Indeed, the tight interrelationship between importing
process technology and exporting the product takes form through
these two dimensions:
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- the new process technology reduces production costs so that the
firm can compete successfully in the highly price-sensitive
international market for wood-products.
- the new process technology improves the performance (quality)
of the product, so that the product meets international
standards.
4.3 Close relationships with buyer.
In many of the technologies incorporated by the firms in the
sample, and in all the export successes with their products, a
close contact with the foreign buyer was crucial. A good example
of this is RAULI's wooden tray. In this case a quick
communication flow between the firm and its American buyer
permitted the former to know about the commercial opportunity,
and later to introduce a new design. By close contact between
the firm and its foreign buyer I mean an easy communication of
business-related ideas, especially before every new business
agreement. An easy ex ante communication flow with the buyer
serves the business relation in several ways. It prevents future
buyer's disapproval of the product (once this is delivered), by
helping the firm to better understand buyer's needs before the
production order is processed and delivered. Also, an easy
communication flow with the buyer can help the firm to detect new
business opportunities and move quickly to profit from them.
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But what is even more interesting, is that sometimes the
foreign buyer establishes the direction of the "sleuthing"
activity, i.e. he orients the firm in its search for new
technological alternatives. In the case of ALERCE, several
technologies that were incorporated, such as finger joints, were
suggested by the buyer or through buyer-originated contacts. The
clearest example at this point is the orientation and direct
support that ALERCE has been able to obtain from its buyer for
specific technology-related projects. It was the American buyer
who introduced the Chilean firm to the two American technicians
who eventually spent six months in the Chilean firm's plant.
This pattern suggests that the buyer not only plays a crucial
role in the development of new products (as the literature in the
field has stressed), but can also be very important in the
attempts at incorporating process technology into the firm.
4.4 Some internal technological capability plus the willingness
to look for local assistance.
Most of the technologies incorporated by the firms were of
foreign origin. However, firms' own technological capabilities
played an important role in the final outcome. Almost all new
technology being brought into the firm requires labor force
training and minor technological adjustments before it can be
used properly. ALERCE's print-design line was significantly
altered from its original design to meet the particular tasks
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that the Chilean firm had to perform. All the chemical
components, for instance, were formulated in Chile and differed
from the original ones. The importance of in-house technical
capabilities for technology incorporation should be stressed. It
is not a coincidence, I believe, that the firm with more highly
trained technical staff appears more successful in incorporating
new technologies.
On several occasions, the adjustments needed to be made on
imported technologies before they could be used went beyond the
capabilities of the firm's own technical staff. The common
solution then was to hire a Chilean technical consultant on a
part-time basis. This local assistance was typically oriented to
very specific engineering problems. Again, one can see a
correlation between the firm's willingnes's to look for technical
assistance locally, and the final success of a given
incorporation of technology.
It is interesting to note that, by using its own technical
resources, local assistance and its experience with previously
acquired technology, a firm can learn to innovate. For instance,
ALERCE designed and built internally its high-temperature kilns,
based on the kiln technology it had brought in 1974 from
Australia.
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4.5 Predominance of Process Innovation.
Of the twelve examples of technology incorporation cited by
the four firms, only one (RAULI's wood tray), can be classified
as a "product innovation." ALERCE's honeycomb might also be
considered a product innovation (in the Chilean market) since the
firm sells it to other wood-product manufacturers. However,
honeycomb is basically used as an input in ALERCE's flash door
production line. The remaining cases were all innovations in the
production process, ranging from a whole new plant to marginal
improvements aimed at mechanizing the production line. Firms in
the sample were basically looking for existing products in the
international market, products that they could produce, and
trying to gain access to modern technology that enabled them to
produce those products at competitive cost and quality.
This predominance of process innovation is consistent with
the literature's concepts in two main ways. First, as I said
earlier, the firms in the sample may be classified as following
an "imitative strategy." An imitative strategy places the basic
weight on cost-reduction efforts in order to compete. Most of
the process innovations in the sample had an important cost-
reduction effect.1 1 Second, as the literature in the field has
11 This is not to say that process technological change is
exclusively cost-oriented and that product technological change
only enhances product differentiation. Indeed, RAULI's wood tray
(a product change) had a crucial cost-reduction effect. (for a
discussion on the cost-reduction and differentiation effects of
technological change, see Porter 1985, p. 177).
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stressed, product innovation requires a very close contact with
the potential user or consumer, more than in the case of process
innovation (because the user's input is very important during the
product's design phase). Small firms that are located far away
from the buyers of their products may find it difficult to
establish that kind of close contact on a continuous basis.
4.6 Firm's willingness to spend "uncertain" money.
Judging from the cases studied, there is a clear positive
correlation between the amount of resources a firm spends in
technology-related activities, such as activities 4.1, 4.2 and
4.4 just described, and the pay-offs it receives in terms of
successful innovation and exports. ALERCE, a firm that has done
well in both incorporating technology and exporting its products,
financed the trip, fee and stay in Chile for six months of two
American technicians who evaluated and improved several aspects
of the production process. ROBLE did something similar by
bringing German consultants into its plant. Executives of both
firms participate regularly in international wood-industry
events. In contrast, ULMO, the firm that showed the least
willingness to commit resources to these rather uncertain
activities, has had poor results with its attempts to innovate
and export.
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The willingness of a firm to spend money on uncertain
activities is more a question of strategic posture than of
financial capabilities. Three firms in the sample were quite
similar in terms of size and financial capabilities, yet they
showed different patterns of technology-related expenditures.
Moreover, the smallest firm in the sample showed great
willingness to spend money on this uncertain, technology-related
activities, in spite of its financial constraints.
4.7 Absence of external capital involvement.
In all the cases, only the Chilean firm paid for the
incorporation of technology. Even in the case of relatively
large investments, such as the building of a whole new plant,
there was no mention of joint-ventures or other kind of
partnership arrangements with foreign (or local) counterparts.
Yet, all firms mentioned scarce capital as a constraint for
better innovation. I believe this self-financing behavior of the
firms in terms of their technological investments is something
that needs more attention. It would be interesting to know
whether some firms have attempted such arrangements and the
reasons for their success, failure or absence.
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4.8 Ability to detect current limitations: breaking the'inertia.
The literature in the field of innovation is full of
examples of firms that failed to innovate because they failed to
recognize their own product or process obsolescence. The firm's
ability to detect its technical limitations and to recognize the
external threat of more advanced technology, then, appears as a
pre-requisite for successful incorporation of technology. This
was exactly the case with the firms in the sample. The more
successful firms in terms of incorporating technology and
exporting were aware of their need to change. Firms like ALERCE
and RAULI have been able to detect their own technical
limitations and bottlenecks (sometimes through listening to
external suggestions) and react to overcome them. ALERCE
realized that its lack of wood-drying and finger-joint equipment
was a major constraint to have export-class products. RAULI
realized that its whole plant needed to be redesigned in order to
be domestically and internationally competitive; marginal
improvements to the old plant would not be enough.
(other important limitations were identified by the interviewees,
although they cannot be solved individually by firms. This is
the case of lack of qualified industry-specific technicians and
engineers in the country)
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V CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Keeping in mind that the small size of the sample implies
that generalizations have to be considered with caution, it is
possible to draw some interesting conclusions from this study.
Toward the end of my research, it was clear for me that the small
firms in the sample do possess what we can call a "technology
strategy." The incorporation of technology in these firms is not
the response to new requirements (standards) from their
international buyers which in turn are the "natural consequence"
of a open, export oriented economy. Instead, network sleuthing
and technology come before exports. The firms realize that in
order to enter the export race they ought to incorporate
technology. They also realize they cannot create internally the
technology they need; they position themselves as "imitative
firms."
Often, the target technology is not only beyond the internal
capacity of the firm, but also the country. Therefore, the
network sleuths are given the responsibility to procure the
required technology from developed countries (mainly U.S.A.).
They concentrate in process technology, a pattern that is
consistent with its needs and relative competitive strengths (see
section 4.5). Even though the technology is basically brought
from outside, the technological capabilities of the firm play an
important role in the final outcome of a given incorporation of
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technology. It is interesting to note, then, that there has to
be an implicit balance between the technological capabilities of
the firm and the technologies being brought by the network
sleuth.
Small firms in Chile, to a large extent, do not benefit from
national policies for technological support. During the last
decade, the national technology support system has been oriented
toward big, established firms. This has compelled small firms to
self-finance all their technology-related activities, and to find
their own ways of getting strategic technological information.
This lack of direct official support for technology matters makes
even more meritorious the effort and achievements of the firms in
the study.
The present thesis raises important questions that are left
unanswered. Bringing up new and deeper questions was the
ultimate goal of this short research. It is not clear, for
instance, how network sleuths select the events, markets and
firms that they eventually contact in order to get technological
information. When a firm decides to look for technology
throughout the world, or even in a subset of the "world" (say,
the U.S.), there are thousands of different alternatives. Each
alternative has a different pay-off. The thesis research does
not tell us what the firm does to make sure the pay-off of its
technology-incorporation activities is maximized. In other
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words, the thesis does not tell us the criterion that firms use
to orient their network sleuthing activity.
Also left unanswered is the question of how local (Chilean)
technical assistance performs. The local consultants are playing
a role of mediation between the world science and technology
system (scientific and technical knowledge) and the users of that
knowledge, e.g. the firms.1 2 When the firm asks for local
engineering consulting, is this technical assistance strong in
some areas and weak in others? Are there specific areas that the
firms find too difficult to develop internally, and for which the
firms have to rely on external assistance?
The thesis does not go into the specifics of know-how
transfer during the technology incorporation process. It is not
clear, for instance, how firms gain access to a developed
country's competitor plant. It is also unclear how they get
enough technological information from that competitor's plant so
that they are able to transfer the technology into their own
plants. For instance, do personal contacts with middle level
technicians from the competitor's plant play an important role?
Furthermore, what is behind the firm's decision to buy, license
or imitate?; what are the pros and cons that firms see in each
of these alternatives?
12 For details about the Chilean mediation capabilities
("capacidad de intermediacion") see Corporacion de Promocion
Universitaria, op.cit. pag 42.
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Another interesting issue to research is the lack of
external involvement (both local and international) in the
technology projects carried out by the firms. Is this only
because potential partners find the domestic market too small or
the industry too unattractive? Or is there a sort of resistance
of Chilean entrepreneurs to give up their independence,
resistance that impedes them to see the possible benefits of such
an arrangement? In many cases, a partnership with an
international counterpart may be an effective way of getting
access to technological information on a continuous basis.
Many of the conclusions and unanswered questions have
implications for technology policy making at the national level.
It is clear that small firms in Chile do not have enough direct
technological support coming from government policies or
institutions. There is room for improvement here. I would
propose that the greatest possibilities for policy improvement
are in the area of providing strategic technological information
that would help firms to select and contact their new technology
sources.
Indeed, it is in this area where firms seem to rely on
nothing else but their own initiative and effort. Given the
multiple sources of technology and the complexity.of the
international technology system (composed by universities, firms,
government institutions, etc.), small firms' initiative may not
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be enough to guarantee that they are making the most effective
decisions. Government support may be necessary. In a way, my
proposition is in the direction of strengthening and formalizing,
through private-public cooperative effort, the "sleuthing"
activity that firms currently perform by themselves.
In today's world, very few managers and policy makers
question the importance of technology in the firms' and country's
growth and development. But for both managers and policy makers,
technology is a difficult subject to control, direct and benefit
from, for it is dispersed and has implications for the entire
economic and productive system. As this thesis has shown, the
reality, problems and challenges faced by small firms in a
developing country (in terms of their technology incorporation)
differ from the ones commonly pictured in the literature of
technology and strategy, posing interesting questions to be
answered. I am convinced that through answering these kinds of
questions, both at the firm and national level, countries like
Chile can improve substantially their use of technology as a
leverage point for development.
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